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ABSTRACT. Inter-state maritime territorial disputes have always long been 
amongst contentious issues among the littoral states in the ASEAN region. Failure 
to judicially manage such disputes may lead to uncertainty-creating the 
possibilities of escalating into open inter-state war. Without border settlement, 
claimant states have to spend substantially for military and security resources to 
protect their interests in the contested maritime areas, rather than developing the 
economic resources of the areas. Any armed conflict not only costs human life but 
also adversely affects maritime enforcement cooperation and diplomatic relations 
of the claimant states, and the overall economic growth in the region. Thus, 
Malaysia taking into account on the adverse impact of unresolved maritime 
disputes, has successfully and peacefully resolved several of its maritime 
territorial disputes with its neighboring States, albeit some of the ongoing 
unresolved territorial disputes (e.g. Pedra Branca island and Spratly islands). 
These resolutions are achieved either through diplomatic channel or by mutual 
agreement with other claimant State to refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice for adjudication. Therefore, the paper’s general purpose is to 
review Malaysia’s conflict resolution through its peaceful approach in resolving the 
country’s various inter-state maritime territorial disputes. Specifically, the paper 
will analyze the diplomatic, legal and other peaceful approaches utilized by the 
Malaysian government to resolve these disputes, particularly involving its 
neighboring states, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. 
 
Keywords: maritime territorial dispute, Malaysia’s conflict resolution, conflict management, joint 
development, diplomatic negotiation and adjudication.    
 
ABSTRAK. Persengketaan teritorial kelautan antarnegara telah lama dan selalu 
menjadi  salah satu pokok persoalan di antara negara-negara berpesisir pantai di 
kawasan ASEAN. Kegagalan membenahi secara hukum persengketaan semacam 
itu dapat mengarah pada kemungkinan peningkatan menjadi perang terbuka 
antar-negara. Alih-alih mengembangkan sumber daya ekonomi di daerah yang 
dipersengketakan, tanpa penyelesaian perbatasan, negara penuntut harus 
mengeluarkan dana untuk militer dan keamanan untuk melindungi 
kepentingannya di daerah tersebut. Setiap konflik bersenjata tidak hanya 
mengorbankan jiwa  tetapi juga berpengaruh secara merugikan pada kerjasama 
kelautan dan kerjasama diplomatik di antara negara penuntut dan pada 
pertumbuhan ekonomi secara menyeluruh di kawasan tersebut. Dengan 
memperhitungkan dampak yang merugikan dari perselisihan kelautan yang tidak 
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terpecahkan, Malaysia telah menyelesaikan beberapa perselisihan wilayah 
kelautannya secara sukses dan damai dengan negara-negara tetangganya 
walaupun masih ada beberapa perselisihan territorial yang masih berlangsung 
dan belum bisa diselesaikan (misalnya Pulau Pedra Branca dan Kepulauan 
Spratly). Penyelesaian persengketaan tersebut dicapai melalui saluran diplomatik 
atau kesepakatan yang saling menguntungkan dengan negara penuntut yang lain 
dengan merujuk pada mahkamah internasional (International Court of Justice) 
untuk meminta kepastian hukum. Berkaitan dengan itu, tujuan dari artikel ini 
adalah mengkaji-ulang penyelesaian konflik Malaysia dalam menyelesaikan  
berbagai persengketaan teritorial laut antar-negara dengan pendekatan 
damainya. Secara khusus, artikel ini akan  menganalisis pendekatan-pendekatan 
diplomatik, legal dan  damai yang digunakan oleh pemerintah Malaysia untuk 
menyelesaikan persengketaan-persengketaan ini, terutama yang melibatkan 
negara-negara tetangga, yaitu Singapura, Indonesia dan Thailand.  
 
Kata Kunci: Persengketaan teritorial laut, manajemen konflik,  penyelesaian konflik Malaysia, 
pembangunan bersama, negosiasi diplomatik dan adjudication 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Inter-state maritime territorial disputes have always long been contentious 
issues among the littoral states in the ASEAN region. Undeniably, maritime 
boundary disputes in the adjacent and opposite seas, and overlapping claims over 
the shared marine resources must be managed properly among the concerned 
states. Without settlement, claimant States rather than developing the economic 
resources of the disputed areas would spend substantial amount of their financial 
resources for military expenditure and for exercising their claims over the 
disputed areas. The ongoing overlapping dispute over the Spratly Island groups 
exemplified the above scenario where the claimant States (e.g. China, Malaysia, 
Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam) have asserted their claims by stationing 
their respective military forces in numerous islands, islets, shoals, atolls, reefs, 
and other marine features. Additionally, the current delimitation problems in the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore may become another source of future conflicts 
among the littoral States bordering the Straits. 
To avoid any escalation of the situation into violent conflicts, Malaysia must 
handle its maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors delicately and 
peacefully. Being one the major maritime nations among the ASEAN members, 
any escalation of armed conflict with its neighbors would inherently jeopardize its 
socio-economic and national security interests. Indeed, approximately 90% of its 
imported and exported goods are carried by seaborne transportation, while the 
seas are vital in generating and facilitating the country’s socio-economic sectors 
ranging from offshore oil and gas-mining industry, eco-marine tourism to fishing 
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industry.1 At the same time, armed conflict between ASEAN members may 
undermine the overall stability and peace in the region. Therefore, taking into 
account on the adverse impacts of unresolved maritime disputes, the country has 
successfully and peacefully resolved some of its maritime disputes with the 
neighboring States, albeit some of its ongoing disputes such as with Singapore 
over the ownership of Pedra Branca island, and with Indonesia and the 
Philippines over the unsettled common maritime boundary limits in the Sulawesi 
and Sulu Seas.  
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The general aim of this paper is to review Malaysia’s peaceful efforts at 
conflict resolution through diplomatic and legal approaches in managing the 
country’s maritime territorial disputes with its neighboring states. The paper is 
divided into two parts. The first part of the paper will briefly identify the potential 
implications resulted from unresolved maritime territorial disputes, particularly in 
the ASEAN region. These two major impacts are: 
i. Impediment to economic and diplomatic relations 
ii. Barrier to effective joint maritime surveillance and enforcement cooperation 
 
The second part of the paper will analyze and discuss what are the diplomatic, 
legal and other approaches utilized by the Malaysian government to resolve its 
maritime disputes with its ASEAN neighbors, namely Singapore, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.  These approaches are: 
i. Negotiations 
ii. Joint Development of the Disputed Marine Resources and Areas 
iii. Adjudication process through International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other 
dispute settlement bodies as provided by the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention. (1992 LOSC)   
 
The paper will also discuss what are the three common characteristics shared by 
the above approaches that contributed to the dispute settlements.  
 
Impacts of the Maritime Territorial Disputes  
The disputes over maritime boundaries between opposite and adjacent 
coastal States in the ASEAN region can potentially impede and destabilize 
economic and diplomatic relations between the relevant disputing parties. 
Consequently, in the absent of settlement, parties involved in maritime territorial 
disputes have the option to reconsider their close bilateral trade and diplomatic 
relations with other contending party; and to certain extreme, they may be forced 
                                                 
1  For further discussion on the importance of sea to Malaysia’s economic growth, see A.H.   
Saharuddin. (2001). ‘National Ocean Policy: New Opportunities for Malaysian Ocean Development’, 
Marine Policy, Vol. 25, pp. 427-436. 
 
 
 
 
 
Jurnal Sosiohumaniora, Vol. 7, No. 2, Juli 2005 :  93 - 109 
 
 96
to severe their diplomatic relations. As far as it can be ascertained, maritime 
territorial disputes among the ASEAN members has never escalated into an open 
armed conflict. The nearest case of inter-state military clashes over a maritime 
territorial dispute in the Southeast Asia was between the Chinese and Vietnamese 
military forces over the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in 1974. 
Even then, Vietnam was not yet an official member of ASEAN until 1995.  
Unresolved territorial dispute not only adversely destabilize bilateral relations 
between the disputing parties, it can also affect regional stability, which involved 
the region’s multilateral states. Even though the potential of transborder armed 
conflict among the ASEAN members over the unresolved territorial dispute is 
quite unlikely, any frictions on their relations will still inherently undermine the 
stability and peace that are currently enjoyed in this region.2 Despite the fact that 
the economic well being of the ASEAN states is susceptible to the global 
international market and economy, the region’s security and political stability can 
also significantly influence their economic progress. Indeed, political stability is 
this region is vital in providing the necessary confidence that foreign investors 
needed when considering to continue or to initially set up their investments in this 
region. It is undeniable that one of the major contributors to the economic 
prosperity currently enjoyed by the regional States such as Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand derived from the continuous existence of foreign investments in 
these countries, particularly from the Japanese and American multinational 
companies (MNCs). Therefore, any settlements of territorial disputes among 
ASEAN members are beneficial to strengthen bilateral trade economic and 
diplomatic relation and to provide regional stability and peace. 
 
BARRIER TO EFFECTIVE JOINT MARITIME COOPERATION  
Maritime territorial disputes and contested shared marine resources can be a 
barrier to an effective joint maritime cooperation and coordination between the 
disputing parties. Undeniably, joint maritime operations between the claimant 
States are imperative to successfully prevent and suppress the alarming rates of 
criminal activities at sea such as human and drug trafficking, piracy, smuggling, 
illegal marine pollution and terrorism in the Southeast Asian waters. Without 
clearly defined legal jurisdiction over the coastal waters and marine resources, 
the task of coastal State to enforce its national laws and regulations against 
illegal immigrants, pirates, drug smugglers, illegal fishing activities and marine 
polluter is difficult one as it needs cooperation with other coastal States sharing 
the coastlines, semi-enclosed seas or straits. At present, there are various 
unclearly defined legal jurisdictions in the regional seas, and some examples of 
                                                 
2  Kelana and Askandar argued that ASEAN members have the mechanism to settle their disputes in a 
peaceful manner as accorded in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  See Musafir Kelana 
and Kamarulzaman Askandar. (2002). Territorial Conflict Management: The Case of Sipadan And 
Ligitan, Paper Presented at the First Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network Malaysian National 
Workshops, The Northern Hotel, Penang, 7th – 9th November, p. 8.  
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such cases occur in the common sea areas shared between Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines in the Celebes and Sulu Sea, and the disputed territorial 
waters and shared boundary line between Singapore and Malaysia, south of Johor 
Straits.   
In the recent years, joint maritime surveillance and enforcement operations 
between the claimant states’ naval forces and relevant maritime enforcement 
agencies are becoming significantly important to prevent the above-mentioned 
illegal activities, notably the rising incidents of piracy. Chalk (1998) in his study on 
contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia argued that the overlapping claims of 
common maritime boundary and uncertainty over maritime jurisdiction in the 
region have resulted in the absent of a multilateral maritime enforcement 
arrangement in which:  
 
“Pirates have used this gap to their advantages, deliberately 
fleeing to territorial/archipelagic waters, or to areas of contested 
jurisdiction, were it is more risky for naval vessels to operate 
unilaterally”. 3     
 
Despite constant efforts by the individual coastal State to conduct 
surveillance and enforcement operations in its maritime territory, the diversities of 
the region’s topographical and oceanographic characteristics inhibit effective 
operations to suppress illegal activities at sea. Relevantly, one of the main factors 
that contribute to recent increasing of reported piracy incidents in the Straits of 
Malacca notably in Indonesia waters are due to the pirates’ ability to avoid 
detection by the Indonesian enforcement authority by hiding in numerous 
secluded offshore islands and deep mangrove swamps scattered along the 
country’s coastlines. Close and friendly relations between the disputing States, 
therefore, are imperative to establish high degree of joint maritime surveillance 
and enforcement operations along their common maritime boundary.   
It is worth mentioning here that in certain cases, the implication of maritime 
boundary disputes settlement can also create another undefined jurisdictional 
maritime area. For instance, the 1969 Agreement between the Government of 
Malaysia and the Government of Indonesia on the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelves between the Two Countries not only delimit seabed boundary between 
these two states but also created an uncertain coastal jurisdiction in a form of a 
lens-shaped 240 sq nm maritime area, south of Singapore.4 Consequently, 
unscrupulous ships operators frequently used this area to conduct illegal dumping 
activity of oil wastes and hazardous chemicals. Without immediate maritime 
boundary settlement between involving adjacent coastal States, Malaysia and 
                                                 
3  See Peter Chalk. (1998). ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 21, January-March, pp.  87- 113.  
4  See Mark J. Valencia. (1991). Malaysia and The Law of the Sea: The Foreign Policy Issues (Institute 
for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur), p. 33 
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Singapore, the jurisdiction of the area will remain uncertain and thus continue to 
be the dumping area of oil wastes and other pollutions for shipping operators.   
 
Diplomatic and Peaceful Means 
There are various peaceful means of dispute settlement, and the most 
common are negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial 
settlement. Even some of dispute settlement mechanisms are suggested in article 
33, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter. Parties involved in international 
disputes, nonetheless, may choose any peaceful means of their own choice to 
resolve their disputes so long as they are not subjected to any treaty that 
resorted them to specific settlement procedures. Overall, there are three major 
mechanisms utilized by Malaysia to settle maritime territorial disputes with its 
neighbors, namely negotiation, joint development of contested marine resources 
and areas, and adjudication process through ICJ. It may be noted that Malaysia 
has yet resorted to any fact-finding and conciliation commission5 as means of 
dispute settlement mechanism for its maritime territorial disputes 
 
NEGOTIATION 
When states involved in disputes, they normally will first seek settlement 
through negotiation. In fact, Ziring, Riggs and Plano (2000) noted that 
‘negotiation among parties to a dispute is older than state system and is the most 
common method of settlement.”6  Historically, Malaysia has engaged in various 
levels of negotiations to peacefully resolve its maritime disputes with its 
neighboring coastal States, namely Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore and Thailand. 
Following a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, Malaysian government 
managed to settle its maritime boundary delimitation disputes with its neighbors 
by means of agreements. Among the agreements concerning delimitation of 
maritime boundaries are as followed: 
i. Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of 
Indonesia on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves between the Two 
Countries, 27 October 1969; 
ii. Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia Relating to the 
Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Strait of 
Malacca, signed on 17 March 1970; 
iii. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, The 
Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand 
                                                 
5  For example, the dispute over continental shelf around Jan Mayen island between Iceland and 
Norway were settled using conciliation commission. See   R. R. Churchill and A. V. Love, The Law of 
the Sea (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 3rd edn 1999); See also Jan Mayen, Report of 
Conciliation Commission (1981) XX International Legal Material (ILM) 797 (1981) 151, 450.  
6  Ziring, L, Riggs, R. and J. Plano. (2000). The United Nations: International Organization and World 
Politics, 3rd edn  (Wadsworth: Singapore), p. 211.    
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Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundaries in the 
Northern Part of the Strait of Malacca, signed on 21 December 1971;  
iv. Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia relating to delimitation 
of the territorial seas of the two countries, signed 24 October 1979; 
v. Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and 
Malaysia on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary between the 
two countries in the Gulf of Thailand, signed 24 October 1979 
 
In general, the aforementioned delimitation of maritime boundary 
agreements shared three major common characteristics during their negotiation 
process. Firstly, the success and effectiveness of negotiation between the 
concerned parties significantly based on the status or degree of relationships 
between the contending parties. When discussing the factors that contributed 
Malaysia and Thailand willingness to conclude agreements in establishing a 
bilateral joint development authority for the exploration and exploitation of 
seabed resources in the their disputed continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of 
Thailand, Ong (1999)  asserted that one of the prerequisites of achieving 
agreement in a negotiation would almost certainly be friendly bilateral relation 
between the concerned parties.7  
Malaysia’s relations with its two neighbors (i.e. Indonesia and Thailand) 
during the time of the negotiation process until their final outcomes were 
generally friendly. All three states enjoyed good relations in the sense of security, 
social and trade. In the context of security relation, for instance, Malaysia and its 
neighbors have good military relation as evident from the bilateral officer 
exchange program, joint military exercises, and maritime enforcement operations 
in the shared maritime borders.8 Malaysia-Indonesia relations were generally 
cordial relations. Except during the Confrontation era from 1963-1966, Musafir 
and Askandar (2000) prescribed this cordial relation as “hubungan abang dan 
adik” 9 and its still continue until today. The 1969 agreement concerning 
delimitation of continental shelf boundary in Strait of Malacca is an early instance 
of agreement resulting from a series of negotiations, which began when both 
parties resume their previous cordial relations after the end of confrontation. 
Moreover, like any other continental shelf boundary agreements in the Southeast 
Asian region, Kittichaisaree (1987) noted that the 1969 agreement was 
                                                 
7  For an in-depth analysis on Thailand-Malaysia joint development regime in the Gulf of Thailand, see 
David M. Ong, (1999). ‘The 1979 and the 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreements: 
A Model for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Petroleum Deposits’, 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp-207-246.  
8  Example of bilateral joint military cooperation is the Malindo Darsasa military exercise conducted 
between Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces. For further readings on regional security 
cooperation, see Khoo How San. (2000). ‘The Role of Defence/ Military in Regional Security 
Cooperation:  An Interpretation of the ASEAN Practice’, Pointer, Vol. 26, No. 3, July-September. 
Retrieved December 24, 2003, from 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol263/2.htm 
9  See Kelana and Askandar. (2000). ‘Territorial Conflict Management’, p. 15. 
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“concluded between politically friendly governments whose good international 
relations played a part in enhancing the acceptability or the flexibility of the 
position of the other side.”10  
The willingness of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand to peacefully 
resolve their respective maritime territorial disputes derived from their shared 
prevailing feelings of goodwill and friendliness, and spirit of cooperation 
embodied among the ASEAN founding members. The signing of the 1976 Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia further added the impetus for the 
ASEAN members to pursue peaceful means to settle their maritime territorial 
disputes.11 It is important to note here that having good friendly and cordial 
relations with other disputing party does not necessary means that maritime 
dispute settlement can be easily achieved if the dispute correlate with other 
lingering unresolved territorial disputes such in the case between Malaysia and 
the Philippines concerning their overlapping territorial sea limit in the Sulu and 
Celebes Seas. And one of the primarily reasons for the failure of both countries to 
agree on common territorial sea limit in those seas is due to other outstanding 
issue concerning the legal status of North Borneo in which the Philippines still 
claimed.12   
The second common characteristic of the aforementioned agreements is the 
varying mutual socio-economic and security benefits derived from these 
agreements. The trend toward “ocean enclosure movement” began to emerge 
rapidly in the ASEAN region beginning late 1960’s, notably among the major 
regional coastal States- Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The 
implication of claiming various maritime zones in the regional semi-enclosed and 
enclosed regional seas correlate with numerous overlapping claims in common 
maritime boundary limit and shared marine resources as Ball (1996) added:  
 
“Of the 30 or so conflicts points in the region, more than a third 
involve disputes over islands, continental shelf claims, EEZ 
boundaries and other offshore issues.” 13   
                                                 
10  See Kriangsak Kittichaisaree. (1987). The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in 
South- East Asia, (Oxford University Press, Singapore), p. 69. 
11  See article 3 and 4 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the Southeast Asia, which was by 
signed on 24 February 1976 in Bali, Indonesia.  
12  The Philippines’ application for permission to intervene in the ICJ case on the dispute over the 
sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligitan islands between Malaysia and Indonesia was due to their 
concern that the decision of the court on this case will affect the country’s outstanding territorial 
claims to North Borneo. For further legal details of the intervention, see Application for Permission 
to Intervene by the Government of the Philippines, 13 March 2001, ICJ Press Release 2001/26 at 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2001/ipresscom2001-
26_inma_20011019.htm 
13  See Desmond Ball. (1996). ‘Maritime Cooperation, CSCAP and the ARF’ in Sam Bateman and 
Stephen Bates (eds). The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Canberra 
Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 118, (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra),  p.  3. 
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Moreover, the disputes over the contested waters and continental shelf are 
exacerbated by the ambiguities, gaps and discrepancies of the legal provisions 
embodies in the 1982 LOSC.14 
The primary incentives to extend their respective jurisdictional control were 
impelled by economic, strategic and national security consideration; and derived 
from the recognition of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Law of the Sea and the 
1982 LOSC on their right to proclaim various maritime zones (e.g. continental 
shelf, archipelagic waters and 200-nm EEZ). The extensions of territorial sea limit 
in the Straits of Malacca by Malaysia15 and Indonesia,16 for instances, would serve 
the countries’ economic interests to safeguard its nearby rich marine natural 
resources- fish stocks and petroleum and natural gas deposits- and create more 
job opportunity in sea-related industry such as offshore petroleum mining, 
tourism industry and fisheries sector. The extension of newly jurisdictional areas 
would also provided the countries with the necessary legislative and jurisdictional 
powers to enforce marine pollution control from the increasing risks of vessel-
sourced pollution in the Straits of Malacca. Additionally, Indonesia according to 
Leifer (1978), has never taken its maritime territory for granted due to “a sense 
of vulnerability that derived not just from the country’s varying geographical and 
ethnicity, but also from historical experience of foreign colonialism through the 
use of sea power”.17 Thailand, on the other hand, wanted to expand its already 
flourishing deep sea fishing industry seaward of the Gulf of Thailand to the 
adjacent South China Sea. 
From the socio-economic context, maritime dispute settlement would enable 
disputing parties to proceed with the exploration and exploitation of marine 
resources, living and non-living, in the contested area. Not surprisingly, 
immediate settlement over the disputed common maritime boundary limits and 
contested offshore marine resources and continental shelf were the immediate 
concerns among the leaders of ASEAN states.1 Agreement on the delimitation of 
maritime boundary particularly with regards to continental shelf would provide a 
                                                 
14  Many of the 1982 UNCLOS provisions are still “lacked of clarity to remove all the uncertainties, 
which exist at present. There are still many grey areas with the law of the sea which require 
negotiation between the interest party.” See Sam Bateman. (1994).‘Maritime Cooperation and 
Dialogue’ in Dick Sherwood (ed) Maritime Powers in China Seas: Capabilities and Rational 
(Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra), p. 144. 
15  Nevertheless, the extension of territorial sea limit from 3-nm to 12-nm was exempted in the Straits 
of Malacca, the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. The reason is due the existence of narrow width in 
certain parts of those seas in which 12-nm territorial sea would overlap with other states’ territorial 
sea limit.  See Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance (Act No. 7) 1969, as amended in 1969.     
16  Indonesian territorial sea was extended from 3 to 12 nm territorial sea in 1960. See Article 1(2), Act 
No. 4 Concerning Indonesian Waters of 18 February 1960; Law No. 6 of 1996 on the Indonesian 
Territorial Waters has revised Act No. 4 of 1960, See State Gazette (1996), No. 73 and Additional 
State Gazette (1996), No. 3, 647.  
17  For an interesting reading on regimes in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, see Michael Leifer. 
(1978). International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 
Alphen aan den Rijn). 
 
 
 
 
Jurnal Sosiohumaniora, Vol. 7, No. 2, Juli 2005 :  93 - 109 
 
 102
clearer jurisdictional and sovereign control in the disputed areas. Both Malaysia 
and Thailand would like to proceed with its development offshore oil and gas 
deposit in the contested continental shelf areas in the Gulf of Thailand and in the 
northern part of the Malacca Straits. This necessitated the immediate settlement 
of their overlapping continental shelf boundaries in the northern part of the 
Malacca Straits between the two countries and Indonesia on 21 December 1971.  
Protecting national security is another inherent benefits ensuing from the 
settlement of maritime disputes. The main reason why both Malaysia and 
Indonesia were willing to resolve their dispute over the delimitation of common 
territorial sea limit in the Straits of Malacca derived from the their intention to 
increase their jurisdiction capacities to enforce various national laws and 
regulations of marine pollution control, fisheries regulation, shipping and 
navigational safety in this narrow Straits. Another incentive for the coastal States 
to negotiate agreement to resolve overlapping claims resulting from their 
concerns on the needs of enforcing stricter laws on marine pollution control due 
over the increasing risks of vessel-sourced pollution such as oil spills from 
shipping collision or intentional dumping of oil wastes. Marine pollutions caused 
harmful affects on the adjacent marine ecosystem and resources and at the same 
time jeopardize the livelihood of the local fishermen. With increasing maritime 
traffic density in the adjacent popular sea lanes such the Straits of Malacca, 
Sunda and Lombok Straits, coastal States feared that unresolved maritime 
boundary in the contested areas would impede their capacity to enforce effective 
national laws and regulations concerning on marine pollution due to uncertainty 
of legal jurisdiction in the contested coastal waters and marine resources.   
The third common characteristic of the above-mentioned maritime 
delimitation agreements is the involvement of only limited number of disputing 
parties. It is worth noting here that the possibilities of achieving agreements for 
dispute settlement is much higher if the numbers of disputing parties are lesser. 
The smaller the number of parties involved in a territorial dispute, the higher the 
chances of achieving any mutual agreement. Indeed, the probability of resolving 
bilateral issues is much higher than multilateral issues. For instance, when 
Indonesia and Malaysia disputed over the delimitation of common territorial sea 
boundary in the Straits of Malacca beginning the late 1960s, both states felt that 
a solution by way of bilateral agreement was preferable. Subsequently, after a 
series of negotiations, both Malaysia and Indonesia concluded an agreement to 
delimit their common territorial sea boundary in the Straits of Malacca on March 
1970. Unlike bilateral issues, multilateral issues particularly concerning 
overlapping claims to islands, islets and shared marine resources are very 
complex due to involvement varying interests and agendas of the claimant States, 
and consequently the dispute is difficult to manage. In the case of Spratly islands 
disputes, Snyder (1996) asserted that smaller claimant States (e.g. Brunei) were 
traditionally reluctant to pursue bilateral negotiations with larger states (e.g. 
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China, Vietnam and Malaysia) for fear that larger states would diplomatically 
overpower its smaller neighbors.18     
Besides maritime boundaries delimitation, Malaysia has negotiated and concluded 
a range of agreements with its neighbors on joint development of contested 
marine resources and joint submission of territorial dispute to be referred to ICJ 
for adjudication process. These approaches will be discussed below. 
 
JOINT RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN DISPUTED TERRITORY 
One of the peaceful approaches taken by Malaysia for its disputes settlement 
over the contested shared marine resources with its neighbors is through the 
establishment of bilateral joint resource development arrangement in the 
contested areas.19 Following a series of negotiation, Malaysia managed to 
conclude agreement with Thailand and Vietnam to jointly develop hydrocarbon 
resources found in the disputed area of overlapping continental shelf claims in the 
Gulf of Thailand. Some of the agreements are as followed: 
i. Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and Kingdom of Thailand 
on the Establishment of Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources 
in the Seabed   in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two 
Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, signed in 1979.  
ii. Agreement between the Government of Malaysia   and the Government of 
The Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters Relating to 
Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, enforced on 30 May 
1990.  
iii. Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam   for the Exploration and Exploitation of the of Petroleum in a 
Defined Area of the Continental Shelf Involving the Two Countries, signed in 
5 June 1992.  
 
The willingness of the disputing parties to compromise and ultimately 
achieve agreement is greatly depended upon the inherent economic and political 
benefits derived from the particular dispute settlement as Anderson (1998) 
pointed out:  
                                                 
18  For further readings on the maritime dispute in South China Sea, see Scott Snyder. (1996). The 
South China Sea Dispute Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy. Retrieved  December 24, 2003, from  
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/snyder/South_China_Sea1 
 
19  Other examples of bilateral joint resource development schemes concerning continental shelf 
resources include the following: 1974 Agreement between Japan and the Republic of South Korea 
Concerning   Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two 
Countries; 1974 Agreement Between Sudan and Saudi Arabia Relating to the Joint Exploitation of 
the Natural Resources of the Sea-bed and Subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone; and 1989 
Treaty between Australia and Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation  in an Area  
Between  Indonesia Province  of East Timor and  North Australia.  
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“The solution of a joint area may be second best to an agreed 
boundary but a joint area may well be better than seeing a 
dispute remain unresolved and possibly grow more serious. The 
governments may prefer a compromise to a defeat in litigation. 
An effective treaty providing for joint development may allow 
industry to work an produce benefits for many years in an area 
which would otherwise have remained blighted by dispute over 
jurisdiction”20   
 
The possibility of bilateral joint development of the disputed shared marine 
resources either, living and non-living resources will depend very much upon the 
political will of the concerned parties to resolve their disputes.21 Since the 
beginning the late 1970s, both leaders of Thailand and Malaysia realized the 
growing importance of energy and oil supply for their countries’ economic growth 
and thus the need to speed up the development of the offshore petroleum 
deposit in the contested areas of the Gulf of Thailand. Recognizing the significant 
economic benefits development of the contested areas, both states agreed to 
compromise and set aside their boundary disputes to allow early development of 
oil and gas resources in the contested area. Similar to the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty 
between Indonesia and Australia, the 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development 
Agreement establishes a very powerful Joint Authority, which assumes the rights 
and responsibilities of the parties in the described zone of cooperation.22 In sum, 
the relevant agreements exemplified the future model for international legal 
cooperation concerning disputed shared marine resources.    
 
ADJUDICATION THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
(ICJ) 
In the recent years, International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principle judicial 
organ of the United Nations, has played a significant role as a dispute settlement 
mechanism for the two cases of maritime disputes involving Malaysia and its 
neighbors, Singapore and Indonesia. Indeed, if the final outcome of negotiation 
on maritime dispute failed to reach any settlement or agreement, the concerned 
parties may resort to judicial method as one of the peaceful means for dispute 
resolution. Dixon (1996) noted that many states in the past have referred their 
disputes to ICJ and other arbitration tribunal for peaceful settlement especially 
                                                 
20  See D.H.  Anderson. (1998). ‘Strategies for Dispute resolution: Negotiating Joint Agreements’ in 
Blake et al. (eds), Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects (Kluwer Law International), pp. 
474-475; Extracted from Ong (1999), ‘The 1979 and the 1990 Malaysia-Thailand’ p. 246.  
21  See Ong. (1999). ‘The 1979 and the 1990 Malaysia-Thailand’, p. 213. 
22  Similar to the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty, the 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreement 
established a very powerful Joint Authority, which assumes the rights and responsibilities of the 
parties in the described zone of cooperation. 
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cases involving delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent and 
opposite States.23  
For Malaysia, the 32-years dispute over the sovereignty of the islands of 
Sipadan and Ligitan with Indonesia is the first ever case that was referred to ICJ. 
The significance of the ICJ role in that dispute prompted Nagara (2002) to note 
that it was “the first time any of the rival territorial claims in archipelagic South-
East Asia had been submitted to the ICJ.” 24 The dispute over the ownership of 
the two islands finally ended on 17 December 2002 when the Court awarded the 
ownership of the two islands to Malaysia.25 Relevantly, the ruling set a regional 
precedent for other regional claimant states involving overlapping territorial 
disputes to mutually agree to a peaceful settlement by the ICJ in the foreseeable 
future. Indeed, the second territorial dispute case that has been referred to ICJ is 
the one involving Malaysia and Singapore over the ownership of Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge. The case is still 
pending.  
There are several common characteristics, which led the two disputes to be 
referred to ICJ for judicial settlement. Firstly, in both cases, prior to their 
submission to the ICJ for adjudication, the concerned parties had exhaustively 
tried to use consultation and negotiation to settle their respective dispute. None 
of these diplomatic approaches, however, successfully settled the disputes. For 
example, before the submission of the Sipadan and Ligitan case to ICJ, Malaysia 
and Indonesia were involved in six Joint Commission Meetings (JCMs) and at 
least three Special Working Group Meetings (SWGMs).26   One of the fundamental 
reasons behind the failure to resolve the disputes through negotiation is due to 
the fact that the concerned parties were more inclined to treat the dispute as part 
of a larger package of bilateral issues that need to be resolved comprehensively. 
Such approach was evident in the negotiations of the Pedra Branca case as not 
only the agenda of the discussion limited to solving the dispute, it also discussed 
other outstanding bilateral issues such as water agreement, the Tanjung Pagar, 
Custom, Immigration and Quarantine Checkpoint (CIQ), the withdrawal of Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) by Malaysian employees working in Singapore. Indeed, K.S. 
Nathan (2002) pointed out this approach of settling their outstanding bilateral 
issues reflect convergence of national interests of the two Causeway neighbors.27  
                                                 
23  See Martin Dixon. (1990). Textbook on International Law  (Blackstone: London), p. 214. 
24  See Bunn Nagara. (2002). ‘Peaceful Conclusion to a Regional Dispute’, The Star, December 18. 
25   For further details of the judgement, see The Court finds that sovereignty over the islands of 
Ligitan and Sipadan belongs to Malaysia  (2002, 12 December) ICJ Press Release 2002/39bis, 
Retrieved January 2, 2004, from http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/ 
ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-39_inma_20021217.htm 
26  For further details on JCM and SWGMs, see Kelana and Askandar. (2000). ‘Territorial Conflict 
Management’, p. 9-13.  
27  K .S. Nathan. (2002). Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Retrospect and Prospect. Paper Presented at 
the 4th Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) Regional Workshop, Held at USM and 
Shangri-La Hotel, Penang, 15-17 July.  
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Secondly, in both cases, after the failure of negotiations, the relevant parties 
mutually agreed to refer their respective cases to the ICJ for settlement through 
the signing of special agreements namely:   
i. Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the 
Dispute between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia concerning 
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, signed at Kuala Lumpur on 
31 May 1997; 
ii. Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the 
dispute between Malaysia and Singapore Concerning Sovereignty of Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Putih, Middle Rock and South Ledge, signed in 14th April 
1998.    
 
It should be mentioned here that within the context of international law, the 
above agreements are vital in allowing the concerned parties to grant compulsory 
jurisdiction to the ICJ. Unlike domestic courts, ICJ does not have compulsory 
jurisdiction over international legal disputes unless the disputing parties 
voluntarily agree to submit their case to Court.   
The third common characteristic of the cases is that   they are all legal 
dispute, and thus requiring judicial settlement. As the cases are inter-state 
international dispute and involved legal disputes over the ownership of islands, 
the interpretation of international law is required to settle the disputes. Therefore, 
Malaysia and other parties have chosen appropriate dispute settlement procedure 
by referring their cases to ICJ for judicial settlement. As parties to the 1982 
LOSC, Malaysia Indonesia and Singapore are highly committed to settle their 
differences peacefully in accordance with international law, either through the ICJ 
or other dispute settlement bodies provided for by the Convention.28 Indeed, as 
accorded in Part XV of the 1982 LOSC, ICJ is one the suggested mechanisms for 
compulsory dispute settlements concerning interpretation and application of the 
Convention’s legal provisions. Moreover, the willingness of Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Singapore to settle their case though judicial method derived from their 
shared prevailing feelings of goodwill and friendliness, and spirit of cooperation 
embodied among these ASEAN founding members. Singapore Foreign Minster, S. 
Jayakumar in his speech to the Parliament on the state of bilateral relation in 
2003 with Malaysia clearly indicated his country willingness to deal with 
Malaysia’s claim over Pedra Branca amicably and in the spirit of goodwill and 
proceed with ICJ judicial process to peacefully settle their dispute over Pedra 
Branca29  
                                                 
28  The recent judgment by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea  (ITTLOS) concerning the 
dispute over Singapore’s reclamation project exemplifies how Malaysia and Singapore willingness to 
settle their problems concerning maritime issues through legal means. For further readings on the 
judgment of the case, see K.Y. Pung. (2003) ‘Save the Straits’, The Star, 9 October.  
29  See Annex to the Ministerial Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prof. S. Jayakumar in 
Parliament, 25 January 2003.  
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CONCLUSION 
Despite Malaysia’s ongoing unresolved maritime territorial dispute with its 
neighbors, significant progresses have been made by the country to settle other 
maritime territorial disputes peacefully by means of diplomatic, legal, and other 
peaceful approaches. Rather than resorting to military force, Malaysia believed 
the spirit of ASEAN goodwill and neighborly relations among ASEAN members 
should prevail when settling disputes among them. Any escalation of violent 
conflict from unresolved maritime territorial dispute among the ASEAN neighbors 
will cost human life, adversely affect economic growth and diplomatic relationship 
of the claimant states, but also jeopardize the overall peace and stability in this 
region.  
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